Is Trump changing US policy on Taiwan?
By the close of the Trump-Xi Summit, government officials in Taipei were likely breathing a sigh of relief. Beyond a relatively routine warning from the Chinese side – naming Taiwan as the “most important issue” in US-China relations – Taiwan did not appear a major part of the agenda. Given pre-Summit fears that Trump might make major concessions to Xi on Taiwan, this appeared to be among the better case scenarios for Taipei. However, Trump’s later comments in an interview after the summit have raised alarm that the US President may have proven himself susceptible to Xi’s overtures. This briefing takes each of the key remarks in turn, and analyses how it compares to longstanding US-Taiwan policy:
“I'm not looking to have somebody go independent.” While taking a novel turn of phrase, this does not diverge from previous US statements that Washington “does not support” Taiwanese independence. Given that China recently pressured the US to go further and state that it “opposes” Taiwanese independence, this could even be seen as a mild rebuke of Beijing’s wishes. Nonetheless, the comments appear to directly critique Taiwan’s President Lai, with Trump also saying that “they have someone there that wants to go independent”. This suggests that Trump has taken Xi’s narratives on Taiwan at face value: declaring independence is not an ambition for Taiwan's government, even under Lai's DPP leadership. Lai has maintained that Taiwan does not need to declare formal independence because it already functions as a sovereign nation.
“And, you know, we're supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I'm not looking for that.” The suggestion that Taiwan’s distance from the US might be a cause of reluctance will be concerning not just to Taipei, but also Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and other US treaty allies in the region. However, by neither ruling out defending Taiwan, nor committing to it, this statement still falls squarely within the longstanding “strategic ambiguity” maintained by the US regarding its willingness to defend Taiwan. Additionally, the US has often emphasised that it wants to see Cross-Strait disputes settled by dialogue, not force – and so it is no surprise that Trump has expressed preference for avoiding war.
"It depends on China. It's a very good negotiating chip for us, frankly." Made as part of broader comments that US arms sales to Taiwan are in “abeyance”, this is the point that will have sent the most alarm bells ringing in Taipei and across the region. The Taiwan Relations Act – one of the foundational texts governing US-Taiwan relations – specifies that the US will provide Taiwan with the resources necessary for its own self-defence. Further, under the Reagan-era Six Assurances, the US has promised to “not consult” with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. Trump’s willingness to discuss these items with Xi – and potentially bargain them away as part of broader negotiations – is a deeply troubling shift. The key deal to watch is a proposed US $14 billion arms package, still pending approval, as well as the US $11 billion package signed off in December 2025, but not yet delivered.
“I want them to cool down. I want China to cool down." Calls for Taipei to “cool down” are awkward for President Lai, who has been criticised by opposition parties for taking a too hostile approach towards Beijing. Along with comments suggesting that he thinks Taiwan “want to go to war”, this again suggests that Trump may have taken China’s narratives at face value. Taipei has already rejected this portrayal – re-stating Taiwan’s support for regional peace and the status-quo and labelling China as the “root cause of regional instability”. Nonetheless, overall, Trump’s calls for de-escalation are not particularly surprising, and do not contradict previous US policy on Taiwan.
What other US policymakers are saying:
With much discussion around Trump’s remarks, other US officials have been quick to re-assure Taiwan and other partners that its stance on Taiwan is not in flux. Notably Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that US policy on Taiwan remained “unchanged”, while playing down the extent to which Taiwan was discussed during the Summit. Similarly, US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent said that Trump “understands the sensitivities” in relation to Taiwan. Importantly, Taiwan still enjoys broad support across the US Congress – with the Senate currently considering a bi-partisan “preventive economic sanctions” in the event of China attacking Taiwan.
The verdict
While Trump’s phrasing is often unorthodox, it does not in itself signal a major change in US positioning on Taiwan. More concerning is the degree to which Trump appears to have adopted many of Beijing's talking points on Taiwan at face value. The real test will be whether US arms sales continue as planned or not. If arms packages are delayed, stalled or reduced, there will be genuine worries that Trump’s “bargaining chip” comments are becoming reality.
What does this mean for the UK and other US allies?
The UK and other US allies may gain some reassurance that the broad contours of US policy on Taiwan remain the same. US deterrence is critical to upholding an increasingly fragile “status quo” across the Taiwan Strait. The maintenance of this status quo is firmly in line with UK interests. Not only has the status quo underpinned peace and stability in the region for decades, it also means that the Strait’s critical waterways remain open to international navigation, and has prevented Taiwan’s critical semiconductor supply chains from falling into the hands of China.
From this perspective, Trump’s dithering over arms sales to Taiwan should be of major concern to the UK. While the UK and other countries have sold arms and military equipment to Taiwan, none are able to provide the scale and range that the US can offer. The UK must take a forward leaning approach to pushing the US to continue its arms sales to Taiwan. In exchange, the UK must step up its role in allied burden sharing on Taiwan – from using its outsized diplomatic influence to counter China’s global narratives on Taiwan, to enhancing unofficial security cooperation, joint training and dual-use technology sales to Taiwan.