Five Takeaways from China and Taiwan’s Eswatini tussle
Last month marked the latest diplomatic tussle between China and Taiwan, after President Lai Ching-te was forced to cancel a state visit to Eswatini. Lai’s trip, originally scheduled for the 22nd April, encountered an unexpected obstacle as Mauritius, Madagascar and the Seychelles – under pressure from China – all revoked overflight permissions at the last minute. This made travel to the small African nation impossible, forcing an embarrassing cancellation of the trip for Taiwan’s President. The final twist in the tale arrived on the 2nd of May, when Lai landed in Eswatini unannounced – having flown on Eswatini’s own state aircraft via a circuitous route around the Indian Ocean – and completed the visit. The episode highlights a number of concerning trends, from the innovative and unpredictable nature of China’s expanding ‘grey-zone’ coercion against Taiwan, to its ability to leverage influence over a growing number of countries in Africa and beyond.
China’s legal warfare over Taiwan now extends to international aviation norms: Under the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, state aircraft carrying senior government officials do require prior authorisation before transiting another countries’ air-space. However, it is rare for countries to deny access, and in particular to do so at the last minute, without justifiable cause. International aviation norms are designed with safety in mind, rather than diplomatic disputes. The weaponisation of these norms represents a concerning new front in China’s ‘grey-zone’ tactics against Taiwan, which seeks to undermine the status quo of Taiwan’s de-facto statehood through military, economic and diplomatic pressure. Taiwan’s position is made more precarious by the fact that its Civil Aviation Authority has been excluded from International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) meetings since 2013 (a decision made at Beijing’s behest), meaning it has few formal avenues to raise complaints. With China’s activities in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea already broadly disputed under international maritime law, this episode suggests that China is now also extending its legal warfare against Taiwan to the skies.
Beijing’s broad interpretation of ‘one China’ policies continues to expand: In explaining the decision to revoke overflight privileges to Taiwan’s state aircraft, officials in Madagascar referred to their ‘one China policies’, while the Seychelles cited their non-recognition of Taiwan. While the ‘one China’ policies held by many countries do refuse diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, this has previously not prevented states from granting air-space access to Taiwanese state representatives. Taiwan’s then President Tsai Ing-wen conducted a visit to Eswatini as recently as 2023, as well as two state visits to Paraguay. These moves are part of Beijing’s broader efforts to bloat the meaning of “one China” policies held by most countries. Rather than a narrow commitment to revoke diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan), Beijing is pressuring countries to re-interpret these agreements as a much broader rejection of any form of engagement with Taipei.
China is leveraging goodwill and economic influence in Africa to isolate Taiwan: According to Taiwanese officials, the three Indian Ocean countries were pressured into denying overflight access to Taiwan on the threat of economic measures, including revoking previous offers of debt-relief. This is part of a broader pattern whereby China has used economic incentives to garner diplomatic support among countries in the so-called Global South. CSRI’s research has previously highlighted how the 87 states that explicitly supported Beijing’s stance on China’s sovereignty over Taiwan received the largest share of China’s development finance, 63% of the total aid offered. China’s growing influence over Mauritius, Madagascar and the Seychelles is particularly notable given the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, and current negotiations between the UK and Mauritius over the future of the Diego Garcia military base.
Taiwan’s persistence pays off, but future visits may become more fraught: Lai’s eventual successful visit to Eswatini highlights the challenges Taiwan will likely face for future official visits. On the rescheduled itinerary, President Lai was required to travel on the King of Eswatini’s private aircraft, an Airbus A340, as opposed to the original charter plane from Taiwan’s China Airlines. The incident also forced Lai to fly a convoluted route over the southern Indian Ocean, extending the journey considerably. Should China pressure other countries to deny airspace access to Taiwan officials, Taiwan’s diplomatic tightrope becomes even more precarious. Although U.S., British and EU officials stated concern at China’s weaponisation of international aviation norms against Lai, many countries would likely acquiesce under sufficient pressure from Beijing.
Incident empowers Lai’s critics at home, complicating defence build up: Criticism of Lai’s handling of the Eswatini visit has come at a precarious time for the Taiwan’s Executive. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan has just passed a much reduced version of Lai’s flagship special defence budget – with the opposition-controlled legislature passing just US $25bn of the originally proposed over US $40bn. As Taiwan seeks to ramp up its defence capabilities to meet the growing threat from China, the KMT – the largest opposition party – has criticised the DPP government for unsettling delicate Cross-Strait relations. The KMT’s chairperson Cheng Li-wun blamed the incident on the Lai’s refusal to accept the so-called ‘1992 consensus’, a contested agreement between Chinese and Taiwanese officials. Cheng – who met with Xi Jinping last month – believes that she can secure peace through dialogue and consensus with Beijing.

