What’s at stake for Taiwan in the Trump-Xi summit?
With US President Donald Trump set to touch down in Beijing for three days of talks with Chairman Xi Jinping, there is no shortage of potential flashpoints between the two superpowers. However, from trade tariffs to the Strait of Hormuz, no issue is as sensitive as that of Taiwan. In a pre-summit call with US counterparts, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi has already claimed that any cooperation is contingent on what Beijing deems an acceptable US policy towards Taiwan. Beijing’s intransigence, Trump’s previously inconsistent remarks on Taiwan, and US distraction in the Middle East have sparked fears that Washington's longstanding commitments to Taipei may be up for negotiation. This briefing examines some of the core issues at stake, in what could prove to be the most significant Sino-American summit for Taiwan since President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972.
Will the US discuss, reduce or delay arms sales to Taiwan? In December last year, the US agreed its largest ever arms sales deal to Taiwan. The package – worth US $11 billion – included HIMARS rockets systems, anti-tank missiles, drones and other ‘asymmetric’ capabilities considered critical to deterring a potential Chinese invasion. However, since then, the package has been on hold, with reports suggesting stalling from the US side to avoid awkwardness before the Trump-Xi Summit. Most significantly, in remarks before the visit, Trump claimed that he would like to “discuss” US arms sales to Taiwan with Xi. The fact that such arms sales are even up for discussion with Beijing would mark a major shift in US policy on Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act – one of the foundational texts governing US-Taiwan relations – specifies that the US will provide Taiwan with the resources necessary for its own self-defence. Further, under the Reagan Administration’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan, the US explicitly committed not to consult with Beijing or set an end date on such sales. Whether US arms sales to Taiwan are discussed during the Summit, and if so, subsequently reduced, delayed or continued as planned – are a major point to watch.
Will the US change any official wording on Taiwan? US Taiwan policy is based upon a series of carefully worded official statements and policies, each of which is minutely scrutinised in Washington and Beijing. However, recognising American eagerness to find a solution in the Middle East, China may sense a unique opportunity to exact a significant change of US official language on Taiwan at the summit. It is worth recalling that, at a 2024 summit with Trump’s predecessor Joe Biden, Xi pushed for the US to reframe its carefully worded position on Taiwanese independence – moving from the US “does not support” to the US “opposes” Taiwanese independence. Not only was this request rejected by the Administration, but the second Trump Administration initially appeared to go even further – with a February 2025 update to the US State Department fact-sheet on Taiwan entirely deleting the claim that the US “does not support Taiwan’s independence”, much to Beijing’s anger. China is likely to push for Trump to, at the very least, re-state US non-support for Taiwanese independence, or even more, to state its explicit opposition. Such a linguistic shift would be a major victory for Beijing – further isolating the historically pro-independence DPP government in Taipei – but may be a price that Trump is willing to pay for concessions elsewhere.
Will there be cause for optimism on re-opening the Strait of Hormuz? The continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz is a source of great worry to Beijing, with China accounting for 80% of all Iran’s oil exports before the war, and Chinese manufacturers reliant on a buoyant global economy to drive exports. However, China is arguably better placed to sit out the crisis than Taiwan. Taiwan relies on imports for 95% of its energy needs, with 35% in 2025 coming from the Middle East, and much of this is in LNG – which is much harder to stockpile. This leaves Taiwan particularly exposed to rising energy prices, especially as demand peaks over the summer. More broadly, conflicts in the Middle East are draining critical US munitions – such as Tomahawk missiles – and forcing the deployment of personnel away from the Indo-Pacific. In all this reduces the US ability to exert effective deterrence over Taiwan, meaning that policymakers in Taipei will be keen to see cause for optimism in a quicker resolution to the US-Iran war.
How will the talks play into Taiwan’s domestic politics? Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te is already facing major challenges domestically. Last week, the opposition-controlled legislature finally approved a long delayed and watered down version of Lai’s defence budget, while Lai’s DPP still struggling to recover from the failed “recall” campaign last year. With the opposition KMT Chairperson Cheng Li-wen travelling to Beijing to meet with Xi last month, there is pressure on Lai to prove to voters that his approach to Cross-Strait relations is working. Any concessions from the US in changing its language on Taiwan, or further delaying arms sales to Taiwan, will only serve to increase the pressure on Lai’s government – and embolden those arguing for a more conciliatory approach to Beijing.