After the China Audit: 5 next steps for UK-China policy
The eleven-month audit of the UK’s relationship with China is over. Now the real work begins.
While the results of the long-awaited ‘China audit’ have only been partially published – hidden away in the wider ranging National Security Strategy (NSS) – the challenge for the UK is clear. The UK must urgently de-risk its vulnerabilities to China, protecting its national and economic security, while finding areas of cooperation that will lead to tangible benefits. Achieving this will require increased coordination across Whitehall departments and a clear eyed approach that is willing to accept the trade offs, risks, and opportunities that are present in the UK’s relationship with China.
This article identifies 5 next steps for the UK government based on what the Audit did – and didn’t – say.
De-risking Critical National Infrastructure (CNI): The NSS acknowledged China’s known cyber and espionage threats to the UK, but the reality is that China continues to play a significant role in the UK’s CNI. China’s sovereign wealth fund holds over £17bn of assets in the UK, with significant stakes in Heathrow Airport, Thames Water and Logicor distribution. The UK relies heavily on Chinese made solar panels, and is considering using Chinese firm Mingyang to supply major offshore wind projects in the North Sea. Removing risky Chinese technologies from CNI, while also removing the five year limit on retrospective screening interventions on pre-2021 investments are essential first steps.
Deterring escalations across the Taiwan Strait: While language on Taiwan in the NSS largely stuck to the UK’s standard diplomatic formulations, its prominence shows that the UK is increasingly irked by China’s escalating grey-zone attacks against Taiwan. Ramifications of a range of conflict scenarios – from a ‘quarantine’ blockade to invasion – would have far reaching impacts to the UK’s strategic and economic interests. The UK must take meaningful actions to deter China from further escalating threats against Taiwan. This means increasing resources to uphold freedom of navigation in the region, while providing meaningful support to Taiwan as it seeks to bolster its resilience to cyber-attacks, undersea cable sabotage and other grey-zone tactics.
Strengthening the UK’s lead in strategic technologies: The previously published Strategic Defence Review rightly pointed out that the UK is likely to be fighting against adversaries using Chinese technology in any future wars that it fights. This reiterates the need for the UK to play to its strengths in strategic technologies. The government should use its upcoming Industrial Strategy to support key sectors where the UK is a global leader and is able to compete with China – such as pharmaceuticals, aerospace, and quantum computing. As space technologies become increasingly important for both defence and civil applications, supporting the UK’s commercial sector through funding, research security and IP protection is critical.
Countering transnational repression and foreign interference: The Chinese Communist Party’s active interest in monitoring and silencing the activities of diaspora groups abroad has been known for some time. With over 150,000 Hong Kongers moving to the UK since the national security crackdown, Beijing’s transnational repression is increasingly being conducted on British soil. Arrest warrants and bounties of high profile UK-based activists are just the tip of the ice-berg, with many more conducting self-censorship to avoid retaliation. At the other end of the spectrum, United Front linked business representatives lobby for more positive perceptions of China in Westminster. Ensuring that United Front linked groups are comprehensively included in the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) is a minimum to addressing these threats.
Establishing red-lines in areas of common concern: China has shown interest in discussions on international structures for regulating AI safety. The UK should use its position as the host of the inaugural Global AI Safety Summit to formalise a regular dialogue with China on mitigating catastrophic risks posed by the growth of AI. This should include establishing ‘red lines’ to prevent AI development in areas such as bioweapons, weapons of mass destruction and autonomous cyberattacks, as well as common regulations and testing standards. Other possible areas of productive cooperation include illicit financial networks and scamming operations, though safeguards should be introduced to prevent such discussions being used to unwittingly conduct financial transnational repression.
Finally, it is worth noting the one recommendation that was publicised in the NSS coverage of the China Audit – the need to increase the UK’s China capabilities across the national security system. With the Foreign Secretary already announcing a dedicated ‘China fast-stream’ within the civil service, the government should also seek to make full use of the wealth of China expertise held by the growing Hong Konger community in the UK – both inside government and in civil society. The government should also seek to emulate the European Commission’s I.D.E.A. China Fellowship programme, bringing in external China experts from think tanks and academia for 6-12 month placements.