Closing Strategic Gaps in the Face of China’s Expanding Influence in the Canadian Arctic
Executive Summary
China’s expanding activity in the Arctic represents a growing strategic challenge for Canada, one that transcends traditional security boundaries and exploits weaknesses in Canada’s policy, infrastructure, and governance frameworks. This report examines how the People’s Republic of China uses economic, scientific, and diplomatic tools to entrench influence in the Canadian Arctic, often under the guise of cooperation, has deepened its partnership with Russia in the region which has undermined Canada’s sanctions, and identifies the policy gaps that allow such activities to gain traction.
Canada’s maritime sovereignty in the Arctic faces both legal and operational challenges that are likely to intensify as climate change accelerates the opening of maritime routes. China’s approach to the Arctic is guided by a long-term objective: to secure a lasting role in the region’s governance, resource access, and maritime routes without direct territorial claims. Since declaring itself a “near-Arctic state” in 2012 (which currently has no standing in international law) and publishing its 2018 Arctic Policy, Beijing has advanced a narrative of the Arctic as a “global commons” and a matter of “shared future for mankind.” This framing legitimizes China’s presence and normalizes non-Arctic state participation in Arctic affairs, potentially undermining the sovereignty and decision-making authority of Arctic nations.
The decentralized nature of Canadian Arctic governance divided between federal, territorial, academic, and Indigenous stakeholders leaves Canada exposed to exploitation by foreign actors who can operate under the banner of science. Canada also currently lacks a dedicated Arctic public diplomacy or strategic communication strategy capable of competing with the narrative influence exerted by foreign actors, particularly China.
The report identifies four primary areas of vulnerability in Canada’s Arctic security posture which need to be addressed:
Surveillance and Domain Awareness Gaps: Canada’s outdated northern surveillance infrastructure and slow modernization timelines under NORAD leave it underprepared to detect unconventional threats.
Investment Screening and Infrastructure Access: The Investment Canada Act does not adequately cover unsolicited, subnational, or non-commercial foreign infrastructure offers, especially those made to Indigenous or territorial governments.
Scientific and Technological Presence: China leverages science diplomacy to conduct data-gathering and infrastructure projects that could have dual-use applications. While federal screening processes have improved, fragmented coordination leaves room for exploitation.
Narrative and Governance Competition: Canada’s incomplete maritime domain awareness and outdated surveillance infrastructure mean that increased vessel traffic, especially by state-affiliated foreign operators, may go undetected or unmonitored in real time. This operational gap is compounded by the possibility that dual-use infrastructure financed or offered by foreign actors could serve as logistical hubs for vessels transiting Arctic waters, bypassing federal oversight. While Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework and NORAD modernization commitments represent progress, neither is sufficient to address the immediacy of China’s expanding activity in the Arctic. The security challenge is not hypothetical. China’s capabilities, such as polar research vessels and deep-sea monitoring systems, are operational today.
The report concludes with several recommendations to address the vulnerabilities identified in the gap analysis. It should be noted that none of these recommendations will find success without the Indigenous Communities in the Arctic being full partners:
Strengthen Arctic surveillance and domain awareness, through establishing an interdepartmental Arctic surveillance coordination framework, led by the Department of National Defence in partnership with Transport Canada and RCMP; updating the 2022 NORAD modernization package to account for the evolving threat environment; differentiating Canadian Arctic sovereignty priorities from NORAD’s continental defence mandate by supplementing joint investments with Canada-only projects; accelerating vessel, aircraft, and satellite renewal to avoid capability gaps; expediting procurement and R&D of modernized surveillance technology tailored for Arctic conditions; and mandating a clearly defined share of defence spending for Arctic security as part of Canada’s 2% of GDP spend on defence. There are opportunities for synergies between engineers and scientists that have already been working in the Arctic to drive new military applications.
Close Infrastructure and Investment Screening Gaps, by amending the Investment Canada Act to create Arctic-specific review triggers tailored for investment projects in strategically sensitive geographic regions and designate Arctic strategic infrastructure as a sensitive sector under national security provisions.
Protect Indigenous Communities from Unvetted Foreign Engagement, by developing a security advisory mechanism that brings together federal, territorial, and Indigenous partners to the vetting process for foreign infrastructure and development proposals; amending the Investment Canada Act to explicitly include unsolicited subnational infrastructure offers as reviewable investments; expanding Indigenous infrastructure funding to reduce vulnerability to foreign offers; and reinforcing and expanding existing initiatives that provide national security training to Indigenous leadership and local development partners.
Counter Foreign Narrative Influence; through building on Canada’s existing Arctic diplomacy strategy by launching and funding a dedicated public diplomacy component that proactively shapes narratives; conducting a regulatory review of Chinese state-controlled broadcasters in Canada; aligning scientific cooperation policies with security priorities; and tightening Canada’s policy on Arctic research collaboration by limiting partnerships to trusted allies.
Enhance Allied Coordination and Arctic Presence; by expanding joint Arctic operational facilities with likeminded allies such as the US, Norway, Sweden, Finland, or Denmark and trilateral and multilateral exercises focused on northern domain awareness; negotiating critical mineral and rare earths supply agreements with allies to diversify Canada’s export markets and reduce strategic reliance on China; building on existing forums such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) to establish an Arctic-focused working group within NATO; augment Canada’s Arctic diplomacy beyond reliance on ‘soft power’ by incorporating enforceable mechanisms; and deepening Canada's involvement in allied technology-sharing platforms to accelerate the development and deployment of Arctic-tailored surveillance and dual-use detection systems.
Assessing China’s future role in the Arctic, the authors of this paper predict several trends, including China and Russia continuing their quid-pro-quo which sees material support for war in Ukraine returned with military technology transfers to help China’s Arctic ambitions; the Polar Silk Road entrenching China’s position as a manufacturing superpower; China continuing to target and influence Arctic Council members through unconventional tactics; and Russia chafing against China’s increased role in the Arctic and considering entrenching Arctic governance in response.
Ultimately, Canada’s ability to defend its Arctic sovereignty will depend not only on military modernization but also on coherent, whole-of-government and intra-federal-provincial-tribal coordination that bridges economic, diplomatic, and Indigenous policy. The window for proactive action is narrowing. The Arctic is rapidly transforming from a zone of cooperation to one of competition, and Canada must move decisively to ensure that it can meet the challenge.